Publications

Naeem, Hadeel (2025). Teaching skills and intellectual virtues with generative AI. Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10089

Naeem, Hadeel (2025). AI and the complexity of pain. Philosophy and Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00988-0

Hauser, Julian and Hadeel Naeem (2024). Phenomenal transparency and the boundary of cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10025-8

Naeem, Hadeel and Julian Hauser (2024). Should We Discourage AI Extension? Epistemic Responsibility and AI. Philosophy and Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00774-4

Naeem, Hadeel (2023). Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible? Philosophical Explorations. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2183240

Naeem, Hadeel (2025). “Epistemic responsibility and using AI systems seamlessly” in the edited book Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Ethics in Military and Humanitarian Healthcare. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-11331-3

Works in progress

Choosing epistemic tools with Lukas Schwengerer (under review)

Minimal epistemic agency with Julian Hauser (under review)

Ameliorating pain (under review)

Contributory injustice and complex pain (in preparation)

Situating the epistemic agent in the AI age (in preparation)

How to design AI for pain assessment (in preparation)

Awards and fellowships

Brocher Foundation Residency (Hermance, Switzerland) | Aug-Sep 2026
Project: Epistemic injustices, AI, and pain

Female Excellence Award, Ethics of Digitisation (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) | Jan 2026
Project: Teaching intellectual virtues with generative AI

Fellowship, London AI and Humanity Project (School of Advanced Study, University of London) | May-Jun 2025
Project: Teaching intellectual virtues with generative AI

Fellowship, Käte Hamburger Kolleg: Cultures of Research (RWTH Aachen University) | Oct 2023-Sep 2024
Project: How to epistemically responsibly form beliefs with AI

PhD Thesis

Is a subpersonal epistemology possible? Re-evaluating cognitive integration for extended cognition

I have a PhD in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. My thesis expands on the extended cognition and extended epistemology debate. I argue against subpersonal virtue epistemology and instead motivate ‘cognitive integration’ to make sense of the epistemology of extended cognition. Specifically, I demonstrate how Andy Clark’s subpersonal virtue epistemology falls short in explaining extended knowledge. My research also provides general reasons to steer away from subpersonal epistemologies. You may download my PhD thesis here.

My PhD was supervised by Duncan Pritchard, Mog Stapleton, and Orestis Palermos. Richard Menary and Dave Ward examined the thesis.