Research

PhD Project

My PhD project and my current research lie at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. In my work, I argue against the idea that we can be said to know something simply because our cognitive systems are functioning correctly. This controversial idea has recently surfaced in the philosophy of mind, taking inspiration from contemporary approaches to cognitive neuroscience. While the idea is intriguing, I argue that an account of knowledge must always also include conscious access on the part of the agent. If we don’t have conscious access to how we have obtained some knowledge, then we cannot become aware of faults that may develop in our means of acquiring knowledge. And that contradicts a well-established principle in epistemology, the responsibility requirement, according to which we need to be responsible for our knowledge. In my thesis (and a paper I’m currently finalising), I argue that we shouldn’t give up the responsibility requirement and that accounts therefore fail if they focus exclusively on cognitive systems rather than the agent herself.

Talks

28th Conference of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology | Sep 2021
Title: Is a subpersonal epistemology possible?

Demarcation of Epistemic and Extended Agency; Vrije Universiteit Brussels | Aug 2019
Title: Epistemic subjects beyond individuals workshop

Workshop with Sandy Goldberg; The University of Edinburgh | Oct 2019
Title: Integration and the reliabilist rationale

Graduate Seminar; Forman Christian College University | May 2017
Title: Implicit biases

Chinese Delegation Lecture; The University of Edinburgh | Oct 2017
Title: Integration and extended knowledge

Social Dimensions of Cognition and Education Workshop; The University of Edinburgh | Oct 2017
Title: Integration in social and extended cognition

Edinburgh Women in Philosophy Conference; The University of Edinburgh | Dec 2017
Respondent for Epistemic emotions

36th Annual Pakistan Philosophical Congress; University of the Punjab | May 2014
Title: On basic beliefs