Publications

Naeem, Hadeel (forthcoming). Teaching skills and intellectual virtues with generative AI. Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10089

Naeem, Hadeel (forthcoming). AI and the complexity of pain. Philosophy and Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00988-0

Hauser, Julian and Hadeel Naeem (2024). Phenomenal transparency and the boundary of cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10025-8

Naeem, Hadeel and Julian Hauser (2024). Should We Discourage AI Extension? Epistemic Responsibility and AI. Philosophy and Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00774-4

Naeem, Hadeel (2023). Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible? Philosophical Explorations. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2183240

Naeem, Hadeel (forthcoming). “Epistemic responsibility and using AI systems seamlessly” in the edited book Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Ethics in Military and Humanitarian Healthcare.

In preparation

Intellectual virtues for the AI age (draft available)

Pain: an ameliorative project (draft available)

Choosing epistemic tools with Lukas Schwengerer (draft available)

PhD Thesis

Is a subpersonal epistemology possible? Re-evaluating cognitive integration for extended cognition

I have a PhD in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. My thesis expands on the extended cognition and extended epistemology debate. I argue against subpersonal virtue epistemology and instead motivate ‘cognitive integration’ to make sense of the epistemology of extended cognition. Specifically, I demonstrate how Andy Clark’s subpersonal virtue epistemology falls short in explaining extended knowledge. My research also provides general reasons to steer away from subpersonal epistemologies. You may download my PhD thesis here.

I was supervised by Duncan Pritchard, Mog Stapleton, and Orestis Palermos. My examiners were Richard Menary and Dave Ward.